Annual Survey of Virginia Law - Administrative Law by Bryson, William Hamilton
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1968
Annual Survey of Virginia Law - Administrative
Law
William Hamilton Bryson
University of Richmond, hbryson@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. Hamilton Bryson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law - Administrative Law, 54 Va. L. Rev. 1459 (1968).
VIRGINIA SECTION 
THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW: 1967-
1968 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
W. Hamilton Bryson• 
This year's survey of Administrative Law focuses upon the four cases 
involving administrative agencies or municipal corporations decided last 
term by courts sitting in Virginia. Though few in number, the cases pre-
sented a wide range of issues including the review of a determination of the 
State Corporation Commission on an application for a branch bank,1 a con-
demnation case,2 the availability of a tort remedy against a municipal corpora-
tiona and a contest over the constitutionality of the Virginia Industrial 
Building Authority.4 
Corporation Commission Appraval of Branch Bank 
I 
The delicate task of balancing the business interest in maintaining an un-
hampered potential for growth and customer service against the public 
interest in avoiding unnecessary and destructive duplication of economic 
effort fell once again to the Supreme Court of Appeals in its review of 
the State Corporation Commissi?n's decision to act favorably upon the appli-
cation of the Schoolfield Bank for a branch office in downtown Danville. 
In Security Bank v. Schoolfield Bank5 the Supreme Court of Appeals af-
firmed the Commission's determination, which was based on evidence that 
the sole office of the applicant bank was frequently crowded, was short of 
parking space, and lacked drive-in facilities. In addition, the Commission 
found that there was no room .for further expansion at that location, that 
most of the bank's customers resided closer to the site of the proposed 
branch office, that the seven intervening banks were all in good financial 
condition, and that there was a favorable trend of economic growth in the 
city of Danville. The latter two factors evidently assured the Commission 
that the existence of a new branch would not jeopardize the position of the 
other local banks. In view of this evidence the Commission specifically 
• Member, Virginia Bar. LL.B., 1967, Harvard University; LL.M., 1968, University 
of Virginia. 
1 Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Schoolfield Bank & Trust Co., 208 Va. 458, 158 
S.E.2d 743 (1968). 
2 Fugate v. Martin, 208 Va. 529, 159 'S.E.2d 669 (1968). 
3Mahone v. McGraw Edison Co., 281 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Va. 1968). 
4 Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968). 
5 208 Va. 458, 158 SE.2d 743 (1968). 
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held that it was "satisfied that public convenience and necessity [would] 
be served" 6 by granting the application. 
Commissioner Catterall dissented from the opinion of the Commission 
on the ground that there was no showing of any need for another bank 
where the branch was to be opened since there were already seven banks 
within one thousand feet of this location. But Commissioners Dillon and 
Hooker and the Supreme Court of Appeals have ruled that "public con-
venience and necessity" does not mean an absolute or indispensable necessity/ 
but refers to a public need in the sense that approval of an application would 
result in a benefit to customers and to the public generally. The Commission 
found that this test was satisfied with respect to Schoolfield's application 
because the establishment of the branch was necessary to adequately serve 
the applicant's existing customers and to keep pace with the expanding 
need for banking facilities which was expected to result from the reno-
vation and expansion of downtown Danville. 
In upholding this determination, the Court cited with approval Wall v. 
Fenner8 which interpreted a similar South Dakota statute and held that 
the purpose of a statute requiring that the "public convenience and neces-
sity" be served by the expansion of banking facilities is to protect the public 
from the evils of unsound and imprudent banking. While the adequacy 
of existing banking facilities may be considered in the determination 
of public convenience and necessity it does not follow that because 
there are adequate banking facilities that public convenience and ne-
cessity justifying another bank cannot exist. If such were the case, 
the statute would tend to deter competition and foster a monopoly. 
We are satisfied that this was not the intent of the legislature.9 
The Virginia Court followed the reasoning and language of this case 
closely in determining that the purpose of the Virginia statute is to pro-
mote a sound and responsible banking establishment and not to provide 
unfair advantages to a few banks. In the Danville situation it was clear 
from the evidence that the creation of an additional branch bank would 
not injure other local banks, but rather would be in the interests of public 
service and convenience. 
The holding of the Supreme Court of Appeals is in line with the 
Commonwealth's general policy of encouraging the growth of its banking 
industry in order to be better able to meet out-of-state competition in 
6 This standard for reviewing applications is provided by VA. ConE ANN. § 6.1-39 (a) 
(1966). 
7 208 Va. at 461, 158 S.E.2d at 745. 
s 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d 722 (1956). 
9 Id. at 259, 76 N.W.2d at 726. 
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financing large projects, a goal which the previous fragmentation of the 
banking establishment precluded. In 196210 banks were allowed to grow 
by merging with banks in other counties so that Virginia corporations 
would not have to seek investment capital outside the state. In addition, 
the 1968 General Assembly granted the Corporation Commission authority 
to amend the charters of state banks and give tltem powers similar to those 
possessed by federally chartered banks.u In this manner state banks can 
be kept in a favorable competitive position with national banks. 
Litigation Against State Agencies 
Two cases involving suits by or against the government were decided 
last term: Fugate v. Martin12 in the Supreme Court of Appeals and 
Mahone v. McGraw Edison CoP in the federal court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia. 
Fugate v. Martin was a condemnation proceeding instituted by the State 
Highway Commission which sought to appropriate a narrow strip of the 
property owner's land. In determining the amount of compensation to be 
paid, the commissioners of the court took into account a deed between 
the landowner's predecessor and the Highway Commission in which the 
Commission had covenanted not to obstruct access to the property. Ap-
parently accepting the property owner's contention that the, covenant 
established a property right which was "taken" upon breach of the con-
tract, and rejecting the Commission's contention that the deed was irrelevant 
in a condemnation proceeding, the lower court accepted the commissioners' 
findings and awarded the recommended compensation. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the 
grounds tltat the commissioners should not have considered the deed be-
tween the property owner and the Commission. The Court's rationale 
was that a condemnation proceeding is concerned with property rights 
rather than contract rights; the breach of a contract is immaterial unless 
it shows property damage arising from condemnation. Since the owners 
had introduced the covenant not as evidence that property rights were 
damaged, but in order to prove and receive damages for breach of con-
tract,u such considerations were outside the scope of the commissioners' 
function. That function, stated the Court, is merely to determine "the 
value of the land taken and damages ... which may accrue to the residue 
10 Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 404, at 565-66. 
11 Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 325, at 434; VA. ConE ANN. §§ 6.1-5.1 (Supp. 1968). 
12208 Va. 529, 159 S.E.2d 669 (1968). For further discussion of this case see Spies, 
Property, 1967-1968 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 54 VA. L. REv. 1244, 1246 (1968). 
13 281 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Va. 1968). 
14 208 Va. at 531, 159 S.E.2d at 671. 
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... by reason of the taking." 15 Because this stat¥tory grant of power 
must be stricdy construed,16 an alleged breach of contract by the Com-
monwealth may not be considered in a condemnation proceeding. The 
proper procedure is to present the claim to the administrative department 
responsible for the breach17 and sue the Commonwealth in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond if the claim is denied.18 
In the sovereign immunity case, Mahone v. McGraw Edison Co.p the city 
of Richmond was joined as a third party defendant in an action for negli-
gence brought by an injured man against the manufacturer of a defective 
Switch activator assembly. The court ruled that there could be no recovery 
by the third parry plaintiff from the city of Richmond because, in operating 
the recreational facility where the plaintiff was injured, the city was per-
forming a governmental function.20 The court based its holding both on 
prior case law and on Virginia Code section 15.1-291 which specifically 
grants immunity to any city or town in the operation of a recreational fa-
cility in an action for simple negligence.21 
While the general rule is that neither the Comm6nwealth nor its sub-
divisions or departments can be sued in tort, a municipal corporation may 
be sued as if it were a private corporation for torts committed while it is 
acting in a non-governmental capacity.22 In such a situation, notice must 
be given within sixty days after the cause of action has accrued,2s and 
jurisdiction and venue are governed by section 8-42.1 of the Code which 
precludes a federal court from hearing the case.24 
The main problem arising in this context is that the line of demarcation 
between governmental and non-governmental functions is, to say the least, 
somewhat vague. As the Court in Mahone observes, the general test is 
whether or not the activity is proprietary. If it is not, and if the "act is 
for the common good of all without the element of special corporate 
benefit, or pecuniary profit ... , there is no liability." 25 Such abstract 
definitions seldom produce clear cut answers in concrete cases; and as the 
15 VA. ConE ANN. § 33-63.1 (Supp. 1968). 
16 E.g., Dillon v. Davis, 201 Va. 514, 519, 112 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960); Painter v. St. 
Clair, 98 Va. 85, 34 S.E. 989 (1900). 
17 VA. ConE ANN. § 2.1-223.1 (1966). 
1SVA. ConE ANN.§ 8-752 (Supp. 1968), §§ 8-38(9) to -40 (1957). 
19 281 F. Supp. 582 (ED. Va. 1968). 
2o I d. at 584. 
21 VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-291 (1964). . 
22Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 9 S.E.2d 356 (1940); Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 
145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939). 
23VA. ConE ANN.§ 8-653 (Supp.1968). 
24 VA. ConE ANN. § 8-42.1 (Supp. 1968). This section _allows tort cases against local 
governments and agencies to be brought only "in a court of the Commonwealth." 
25 281 F. Supp. at 584. 
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government increases its activities in areas previously reserved for private 
endeavor, the distinction between the two functions is apt to become even 
more obscure. In order to alleviate this inevitable problem, the legislature 
should attempt to establish definitive guidelines for private citizens seeking 
redress for the negligent conduct of municipal corporations. 
The Industrial Building Autbority 
The case of Button v. Day26 involved an original petition for mandamus 
to test the constitutional validity of the Virginia Industrial Building 
Authority Act.27 The Authority was an administrative agency established 
by the General Assembly to encourage the development of industry within 
the state and was delegated power to guarantee, out of a specific fund, loans 
to private industry for the location of future plants within the state. 
Although the General Assembly had appropriated 2500 dollars for the use of 
the Authority, the Comptroller refused to disburse the money on the 
grounds that the Authority's power contravened the credit clause of the 
Vrrginia Constitution.28 The Attorney General then petitioned the Supreme 
Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus29 which was denied on the 
ground that the Commonwealth was applying the credit of the state to 
private debts in violation of the constitutional prohibition. 
The credit clause of the Virginia Constitution is explicit in its language: 
"Neither the credit of the State, nor any county, city or town, shall be, 
directly or indirectly, under any device or pretense whatsoever, granted 
to or in aid of any person, association, or corporation .... " 30 
The Attorney General argued that the functions of the Authority were 
to stimulate industrial growth, reduce unemployment and foster economic 
well-being in the state, all of which constituted proper governmental 
functions. In rejecting this contention the Court pointed out that not 
every method for advancing proper governmental goals is necessarily per-
missible. It found that the primary function of the Authority was to 
guarantee otherwise unobtainable loans which had been secured by private 
firms from private sources to finance construction or improvement of 
privately owned industrial plants; benefit to the state was only incidental. 
The Attorney General attempted to deemphasize the credit-producing 
function of the Authority by arguing that only one appropriation had 
been made and that, due to the limited nature of the special fund, further 
appropriations would not be necessary in the future. The Court made it 
26 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968). 
27VA. ConE ANN.§§ 2.1-64.4 to -64.14 (1966). 
28 v A. CoNST. art. XIII, § 185. 
29 Original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus is provided for in VA. ConE 
ANN. S 8-714 (1957). 
30 VA. CoNST. art. XIII, s 185. 
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clear that, so long as the primary purpose of the fund was to grant credit 
to private interests, ,it could not constitutionally stand regardless of how it 
had been established. The Court intimated, however, that had the funds 
been directed toward public ownership of the facilities, the Authority 
would have passed muster even though the facilities might have been 
privately operated. Moreover, the plan would have been permissible if 
the money used to guarantee loans had not come from appropriations of 
public funds or if the state had given money outright to the private 
interests. But, as created, the Authority was clearly a government agency 
holding funds for possible future payment of private debts and it clearly 
transgressed the letter and the spirit of the credit clause. 
At the conclusion of its opinion, the court pointed to a proposed 
amendment to section 185 of the Constitution which had been approved 
by the 1966 session of the General Assembly and referred to the next 
session: 
This section shall not be construed to prohibit the General Assembly 
from establishing an authority with power to insure and guarantee 
loans secured by first deed of trust or first mortgage on privately 
owned industrial plants to finance industrial development and in-
dustrial expansion, and from making appropriations to such authority 
to enable it to exercise such power.s1 
Unfortunately this proposed amendment was not passed by the 1968 legis-
lature. If Virginia is to continue with the Industrial Building Authority 
program, an amendment such as this is a necessity. 
Despite this painful lesson regarding extension of credit to the private 
sector of the economy, the leaders of the Commonwealth should recognize 
that a prudent approach to government support of industrial ventures can 
be vital to the industrialization and economic well-being of the Common-
wealth. The legislation establishing the Industrial Building Authority repre-
sented such an approach, giving creditors access only to a specific and 
limited fund and restricting the power of the Authority to increase the ex-
tension of state credit or borrow money. With ~these factors in mind, the 
General Assembly should again consider the 1966 legislature's proposed 
amendment to section 185 so that the Authority can be resuscitated. 
31Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 505, 158 S.E.2d 735,742 (1968). The resolution referred 
to is S.R. No. 39, Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 726, at 1583-84. 
